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Abstract
The revelation principle asserts that for any indirect mechanism and equilibrium,
there is a corresponding direct mechanism with truth as an equilibrium. Although
the revelation principle has been a fundamental theorem in the theory of mechanism
design for a long time, so far the costs related to strategic actions of agents spent
in a mechanism have not been fully discussed. In this paper, we investigate the
correctness of the revelation principle when strategies of agents are costly. We point
out two key results: (1) The strategic action of each agent in a direct mechanism is
just to report a type. Each agent does not need to take any other action to prove
himself that his reported type is truthful, and should not play any strategic action
as chosen in an indirect mechanism. Hence in a direct mechanism, each agent should
not spend strategic costs occurred in an indirect mechanism (see Proposition 1); (2)
When strategic costs cannot be neglected in the indirect mechanism, the proof of
revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 of the book \A. Mas-Colell, M.D.
Whinston and J.R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995"
is wrong (see Proposition 2). We construct a simple labor model to show that a
Bayesian implementable social choice function is not truthfully implementable (see
Proposition 4), which contradicts the revelation principle.
JEL codes: D71, D82
Key words: Revelation principle; Game theory; Mechanism design.
1 Introduction
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in mechanism design theo-
ry [1{3]. According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whin-
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ston and Green (Page 884, Line 24 [3]): \The implication of the revelation
principle is ... to identify the set of implementable social choice functions in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need only identify those that are truthfully
implementable." Put in other words, the revelation principle says: \suppose
that there exists a mechanism that implements a social choice function f in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium" (Page 76, Theorem 2.4, [4]). Related denitions about the
revelation principle are given in Section 2, which are cited from Section 23.B
and 23.D of MWG's textbook [3].
Generally speaking, agents may spend some costs when participating a mech-
anism. There are two kinds of costs possibly occurred in a mechanism: 1)
strategic costs, which are possibly spent by agents when playing strategies
1 ; 2) misreporting costs, which are possibly spent by agents when reporting
types falsely. 2 In the traditional literature of mechanism design, costs are
usually referred to the former. Recently, some researchers began to investigate
misreporting costs. For every type  and every type ^ that an agent might mis-
report, Kephart and Conitzer [6] dened a cost function as c(; ^) for doing
so. Traditional mechanism design is just the case where c(; ^) = 0 every-
where, and partial verication is a special case where c(; ^) 2 f0;1g [7,8].
Kephart and Conitzer [6] proposed that when reporting truthfully is costless
and misreporting is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold.
Despite these accomplishments, so far people seldom consider the two kinds
of costs simultaneously. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the
revelation principle still holds when two kinds of costs are considered. The
paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will analyze the strategic costs
possibly occurred in an indirect mechanism, and point out two key points:
(1) Each agent's strategy in a direct mechanism is just to report a type. Each
agent does not need to take any other action to prove himself that his reported
type is truthful, and should not play any strategic action as chosen in an in-
direct mechanism. Hence in a direct mechanism, each agent should not spend
strategic costs occurred in an indirect mechanism (see Proposition 1);
(2) When strategic costs cannot be neglected, the proof of revelation principle
in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong (see Proposition 2).
In Section 3, we construct a simple labor model, then dene a social choice
function f and an indirect mechanism  , in which strategies of agents are cost-
ly. In Section 4, we prove f can be implemented by the indirect mechanism  
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In Section 5, we show that the Bayesian imple-
mentable social choice function f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium under some conditions (see Proposition 4), which contradicts
the revelation principle. In the end, Section 6 draws conclusions.
1 For example, agents may spend education costs in a job market [5].
2 It is usually assumed that each agent can report his true type with zero cost.
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2 Analysis of strategic costs
In this section, we will investigate strategic costs spent by agents in a mech-
anism in detail. In the beginning ,we cite some denitions from Section 23.B
and Section 23.D of MWG's textbook [3]. Consider a setting with I agents,
indexed by i = 1;    ; I. Each agent i privately observes his type i that de-
termines his preferences. The set of possible types of agent i is denoted as i.
The agent i's utility function over the outcomes in set X given his type i is
ui(x; i), where x 2 X.
Denition 23.B.1 [3]: A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : 1 
    I ! X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types 1;    ; I ,
assigns a collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3 [3]: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection of
I strategy sets S1;    ; SI and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X.
Note 1: At rst, the designer has a favorite social choice function f(), but he
does not know the private type 1;    ; I of each agent i = 1;    ; I, and he
cannot enforce agents to report their types truthfully. Then, what the designer
can do is just to construct a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g) to attract each
agent i to voluntarily choose a strategy si() 2 Si to play. Note that the full
details of each agent i's strategic plan si() are private and not observable to
the designer, and only the result of each agent i's strategic action si(i) 2 Si is
observable to the designer, in which i is agent i's private type. At last, after
each agent i performs his strategic action si(i), the designer announces the
outcome g(s1(1);    ; sI(I)) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.5 [3]: A direct mechanism is a mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0())
in which S 0i = i for all i and g
0() = f() for all  2 1     I .
Note 2: In a direct mechanism, the strategy of each agent i with private type
i is just to choose some type s
0
i(i) 2 i to report, and the reported type s0i(i)
does not need to be his private type i. After the designer receives all reports
s01(1);    ; s0I(I), he must announce the outcome f(s01(1);    ; s0I(I)).
Note 3: Strategic costs are not clearly specied in Denition 23.B.3 and Def-
inition 23.B.5. Generally speaking, strategic costs can be nancial costs or
eorts spent by agents when playing strategies in a mechanism. Usually, re-
porting a type truthfully in a direct mechanism is considered to be costless for
each agent. 3 However, strategic costs related to each agent i's strategic action
si(i) in an indirect mechanism may be signicant and cannot be neglected.
3 As discussed in [6{8], misreporting in a direct mechanism may be costly.
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Denition 23.D.1 [3]: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]
for all s^i 2 Si.
Denition 23.D.2 [3]: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Denition 23.D.3 [3]: The social choice function f() is truthfully imple-
mentable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if
s0i (i) = i for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the direct revelation mechanism  0 = (1;    ;I ; f()). That is, if for all
i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)
for all ^i 2 i.
Proposition 1: The strategic action of each agent i in the direct mechanism
 0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()) is just to report a type from i. Each agent i does
not need to take any other action to prove himself that his reported type is
truthful, and should not play any strategic action as chosen in an indirec-
t mechanism. Hence, in a direct mechanism, each agent i should not spend
strategic costs occurred in an indirect mechanism.
Proof: As pointed out in Denition 23.B.5 and Note 2, in the direct mecha-
nism  0, the strategy set S 0i = i, which means that the strategy s
0
i of agent i
with true type i is just to choose a type from i to report, i:e:, s
0
i(i) 2 i.
Obviously, in the direct mechanism the designer still cannot enforce each a-
gent to report truthfully, and each agent does not need to take any action to
prove himself that his reported type is truthful. 4
Hence, each agent i with true type i will misreport another type s
0
i(i) 6= i,
s0i(i) 2 i if doing so is worthwhile. Note that after the designer receives
reports s01(1);    ; s0I(I), he has no way to verify the truthfulness of these
4 Otherwise, assume to the contrary that each agent i has to submit some additional
evidences to the designer in order to prove himself that his reported type is truthful,
i:e:, s0i(i) = i. Then there is no information disadvantage from the viewpoint of
the designer: the agents' types 1;    ; I are no longer their private information,
and the designer can directly specify his favorite outcome f(1;    ; I) without
any uncertainty. Note that this case contradicts the basic framework of mechanism
design, therefore the assumption does not hold.
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reports. What the designer can only do is just to announce the outcome
f(s01(1);    ; s0I(I)). Thus, it is illegal for the designer in a direct mecha-
nism to require each agent i play any strategic action chosen in any indirect
mechanism   as an additional action. As a result, in a direct mechanism,
each agent i should not spend strategic costs related to any strategic action
specied in any indirect mechanism. 2
Two possible questions about Proposition 1 are as follows.
Question 1: Someone may disagree with Proposition 1 and argue that De-
nition 23.B.5 may be modied such that each agent also spend strategic costs.
For example, for a given social choice function f , the designer denes an
extended direct mechanism, in which each agent reports his type, then the
designer suggests to each agent which action to take, and the nal outcome
function of the extended direct mechanism depends on agents' actions and is
just equal to f .
Answer 1: For a given social choice function f , suppose there is an indirect
mechanism that implement f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Note that behind
the extended direct mechanism, there actually is an underlying assumption:
Each agent is willing to inform his private strategy chose by himself in the
indirect mechanism to the designer before the extended direct mechanism be-
gins. Only when this assumption holds can the designer suggest to each agent
which strategic action to take after receiving an arbitrary prole of agents'
reported types.
Obviously, the justication of the extended direct mechanism relies on the
correctness of this underlying assumption, i:e:, whether it is reasonable to
assume each agent i is willing to inform his private strategy chosen by himself
in an indirect mechanism to the designer.
Note that in the framework of mechanism design, a strategy for each agent
i in a game of incomplete information created by an indirect mechanism is a
function si : i ! Si describing agent i's choice for each possible type in i
that he might have [3]. The strategy of each agent in an indirect mechanism
is his private choice. Thus, it is unreasonable to assume that each agent will
voluntarily inform his private strategy chosen in an indirect mechanism to the
designer. As a comparison, the MWG's direct mechanism does not need this
assumption (see Denition 23.B.5 [3]).
Furthermore, for a given social choice function f , there may exist multiple
feasible indirect mechanisms that can implement f in Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium. Thus, following the above-mentioned assumption, with respect to the
SCF f , agents may have multiple kinds of strategies corresponding to these
feasible indirect mechanisms. However, the direct mechanism corresponding
to the given SCF f must be unique, which means that in the denition of the
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direct mechanism, the combination of input parameters of outcome function
must be unique too. Hence, the denition of direct mechanism cannot relate
to any strategy chosen by agents in any feasible indirect mechanism. This is
just what the MWG's direct mechanism is dened: In the direct mechanism
given by Denition 23.B.5 [3], the SCF f itself is viewed as a simple kind of
mechanism, in which the set of strategies available to each agent i is the set
of his types, and the outcome function is simply f and irrelevant to any other
strategy.
Therefore, the above-mentioned assumption is unreasonable and the extended
direct mechanism does not hold. 2
Question 2: Someone may object to Proposition 1 as follows: Consider the
equilibrium in an indirect mechanism, there is a mapping from vectors of
agents' types into outcomes. Now suppose we take that mapping to be a
revelation game, then no type of any agent can make an announcement that
diers from his true type and do better.
Answer 2: To speak frankly, this argument is equivalent to the proof of
revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] (see Appendix). We will
discuss this case by the following Proposition 2. 2
Proposition 2: When strategic costs spent in an indirect mechanism cannot
be neglected, the proof of the revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1
is wrong.
Proof: Following the description of Proposition 23.D.1 (see Appendix), sup-
pose that there exists an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that
implements the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
the mapping g(s()) : 1      I ! X from a vector of agents' types
 = (1;    ; I) into an outcome g(s()) is equal to the desired outcome f()
for all  2 1     I . For all i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji];
for all s^i 2 Si. Note that in this inequality, the utility function ui of each agent
i (i = 1;    ; I) already reects the fact that each agent i spends strategic costs
related to si (i) chosen by agent i in the indirect mechanism  .
Now let us take the mapping g(s()) to be a direct revelation game, in which
the strategy set of agent i is his type set, S 0i = i, and the designer carries
out the outcome function g0() = f() directly. Following Proposition 1, in this
direct mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), each agent i only reports a type
and does not spend any strategic cost related to some strategic action chosen
in an indirect mechanism. Thus, when strategic costs cannot be neglected
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in the indirect mechanism, the utility function of each agent i in the direct
mechanism  0 should be modied from the original ui to a new utility function
u0i, which does not contain the item related to strategic costs spent by agent i
in the indirect mechanism. 5
Consequently, in order to judge whether f is truthfully implementable or not
when strategies of agents are costly, the criterion should be modied from the
inequality (23.D.1) given in Denition 23.D.3 to the following new inequality
(23.D.1)': When strategies of agents are costly, f is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [u
0
i(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [u0i(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)0
for all ^i 2 i, in which u0i is the new utility function of agent i in the direct
mechanism, and is not equal to ui in the original indirect mechanism.
Therefore, the last inequality (23.D.4) in the proof of Proposition 23.D.1 (see
Appendix) is not equal to the new criterion inequality (23.D.1)'. Put dierent-
ly, when strategic costs cannot be neglected in the indirect mechanism, by the
last inequality (23.D.4) we cannot derive that f is truthfully implementable in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Thus, the proof of the revelation principle given
in Proposition 23.D.1 is wrong. 2
3 A labor model and a social choice function f
Here we construct a labor model which uses some ideas from the rst-price
sealed auction model in Example 23.B.5 [3] and the signaling model [3,5].
There are one rm and two agents. Agent 1 and Agent 2 dier in the number
of units of output they produce if hired by the rm, which is denoted by
productivity type. The rm wants to hire an agent with productivity as high
as possible, and the two agents compete for this job oer.
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
1) The possible productivity types of two agents are: L and H , where H >
L > 0. Each agent i's productivity type i (i = 1; 2) is his private information.
2) There is a certicate that the rm can announce as a hire criterion. If each
of (or neither of) two agents has the certicate, then each agent will be hired
with probability 0.5. The education level corresponding to the certicate is
eH > 0. Each agent decides by himself whether to get the certicate or not,
hence the possible education level is eH or 0. The education level does nothing
5 For example, in Section 5, the utility function of agent i in the direct mechanism
is modied from Eq (3) to Eq (9) and Eq (10), which does not contain the item
related to the strategic costs \bi=i".
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for an agent's productivity.
3) The strategic cost of obtaining education level ei for an agent i (i = 1; 2)
of productivity type i is given by a function c(ei; i) = ei=i. That is, the
strategic cost is lower for a higher productivity agent.
4) The misreporting cost for a low-productivity agent to report the high pro-
ductivity type H is a xed value cmis  0. In addition, a high-productivity
agent is assumed to report the low productivity type L with zero costs.
The labor model's outcome is represented by a vector (y1; y2), where yi denotes
the probability that agent i gets the job oer with wage w > 0 chosen by the
rm. Recall that the rm does not know the exact productivity types of two
agents, but its aim is to hire an agent with productivity as high as possible.
This aim can be represented by a social choice function f() = (y1(); y2()),
in which  = (1; 2),
y1() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 > 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 < 2
; y2() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 < 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 > 2
;
f() = (y1(); y2()) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
: (1)
In order to implement the above social choice function f(), the rm designs an
indirect mechanism   = (S1; S2; g) as follows: Each agent i = 1; 2, conditional
on his type i 2 fL; Hg, chooses his education level as a bid bi : fL; Hg !
f0; eHg. The strategy set Si is the set of agent i's all possible bids, and the
outcome function g is dened as:
g(b1; b2) = (p1; p2) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if b1 = eH ; b2 = 0
(0:5; 0:5); if b1 = b2 = eH , or b1 = b2 = 0
(0; 1); if b1 = 0; b2 = eH
; (2)
where pi (i = 1; 2) is the probability that agent i gets the job oer.
Let u0 be the expected utility of the rm, and u1; u2 be the expected utilities
of agent 1; 2 in the indirect mechanism   respectively, then u0(b1; b2) = p11+
p22   w, and for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
ui(bi; bj; i) =
8>><>>:
w   bi=i; if bi > bj
0:5w   bi=i; if bi = bj
 bi=i; if bi < bj
:
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For the case of bi < bj, there must be bi = 0. Therefore,
ui(bi; bj; i) =
8>><>>:
w   bi=i; if bi > bj
0:5w   bi=i; if bi = bj
0; if bi < bj
: (3)
The item \bi=i" occurred in Eq (3) reects the strategic costs spent by agent
i of type i when he performs the strategy bi(i) in the indirect mechanism.
Suppose the reserved utilities of agent 1 and agent 2 are both zero, then the
individual rationality (IR) constraints are: ui(bi; bj; i)  0, i = 1; 2.
4 f is Bayesian implementable
Proposition 3: If w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), the social choice function f()
given in Eq (1) is Bayesian implementable, i.e., it can be implemented by the
indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a separating strategy, i:e:, agents with dierent productivity
types choose dierent education levels,
b1(1) =
8<:eH ; if 1 = H0; if 1 = L ; b2(2) =
8<:eH ; if 2 = H0; if 2 = L : (4)
Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Assume bj(j) (j = 1; 2) takes this form, i:e:,
bj(j) =
8<:eH ; if j = H0; if j = L ; (5)
then we consider agent i's problem (i = 1; 2; i 6= j). For each i 2 fL; Hg,
agent i solves a maximization problem: maxbi h(bi; i), where by Eq (3) the
object function is
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=i)P (bi > bj(j)) + (0:5w   bi=i)P (bi = bj(j)) (6)
We discuss this maximization problem in four dierent cases:
1) Suppose i = j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = 0)
=
8<:w   eH=L; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; L) < h(0; L), which means the optimal
value of bi(L) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
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2) Suppose i = L, j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=L; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; L) < h(0; L), which means the optimal
value of bi(L) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
3) Suppose i = H , j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = 0)
=
8<:w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; H) > h(0; H), which means the optimal
value of bi(H) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
4) Suppose i = j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; H) > h(0; H), which means the optimal
value of bi(H) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
From the above four cases, it can be seen that if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L),
then the strategy bi (i) of agent i
bi (i) =
8<:eH ; if i = H0; if i = L (7)
will be the optimal response to the strategy bj(j) of agent j (j 6= i) given
in Eq (5). Therefore, the strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game induced by  .
Now let us investigate whether the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) satises the
individual rationality (IR) constraints. Following Eq (3) and Eq (7), the (IR)
constraints are changed into: 0:5w bH=H > 0. Obviously, w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L)
satises the (IR) constraints.
In summary, if w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), then by Eq (2) and Eq (7), for any
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 = (1; 2), where 1; 2 2 fL; Hg, there holds:
g(b1(1); b

2(2)) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
; (8)
which is the social choice function f() given in Eq (1). Thus, f() can be
implemented by the indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
5 The Bayesian implementable f is not truthfully implementable
In this section, we will show by an example that a Bayesian implementable
social choice function is not truthfully implementable, which means that the
revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of agents are costly.
Proposition 4: If the misreporting cost cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the social choice
function f() given in Eq (1) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the direct revelation mechanism  0 = (1;2; f()), in which
1 = 2 = fL; Hg,  = (1; 2) 2 1  2. The timing steps of  0 are as
follows:
1) Each agent i (i = 1; 2) with true type i reports a type ^i 2 i to the rm.
Here ^i may not be equal to i.
2) The rm performs the outcome function f(^1; ^2) as specied in Eq (1).
According to Proposition 1, in the direct mechanism, each agent i only reports
a type and does not spend the strategic costs. The only possible cost needed
to spend is the misreporting cost cmis for a low-productivity agent to falsely
report the high productivity type H . For agent i (i = 1; 2), if his true type is
i = L, his utility function will be as follows:
u0i(^i; ^j; i = L) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
w   cmis; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w   cmis; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (9)
If agent i's true type is i = H , his utility function will be as follows:
u0i(^i; ^j; i = H) =
8>><>>:
w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H); or(L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (10)
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Note that the strategic cost item \bi=i" occurred in Eq (3) disappears in Eq
(9) and Eq (10). Following Eq (9) and Eq (10), we will discuss the utility matrix
of agent i and j in four cases. The rst and second entry in the parenthesis
denote the utility of agent i and j respectively.
Case 1: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = H , j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for agent i and j is to truthfully
report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H . Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) =
(H ; H).
Case 2: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = L, j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w   cmis; 0) (0:5w   cmis; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for agent j is still to truthfully
report ^j = H ; and if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for agent i is to falsely report ^i = H , otherwise agent i would
truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
Case 3: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = H , j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   cmis)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w   cmis)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for agent i is still to truthfully
report ^i = H ; and if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for agent j is to falsely report ^j = H , otherwise agent j would
truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
Case 4: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = L, j = L.
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HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   cmis)
H (w   cmis; 0) (0:5w   cmis; 0:5w   cmis)
It can be seen that: if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for both agent i and agent j is to falsely report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H ,
otherwise both agents would truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of
cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
To sum up, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique equilibri-
um of the game induced by the direct mechanism  0 is to xedly report
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and the unique outcome of  
0 is that each agent has the
same probability 0.5 to get the job oer. Consequently, the truthful report
^i = i (for all i 2 i, i = 1; 2) is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
direct revelation mechanism.
By Denition 23.D.3 and Proposition 1, the Bayesian implementable social
choice function f() is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equi-
librium under the condition of w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) and cmis 2 [0; 0:5w),
which means the revelation principle does not hold. 2
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate whether the revelation principle holds or not
when strategies of agents are costly. In Section 2, the strategic costs possibly
occurred in a mechanism are analyzed in detail. The main results are Propo-
sition 1 and Proposition 2. We point out that when strategies of agents are
costly in the indirect mechanism, the utility functions of agents in the direct
mechanism are dierent from those in the original indirect mechanism. Hence,
the criterion to judge whether a social choice function is truthfully imple-
mentable should be modied as described in the proof of Proposition 2. This
is the key reason why the proof of revelation principle given in Proposition
23.D.1 [3] is wrong.
In Section 3, we propose a simple labor model, in which agents spend strategic
costs in an indirect mechanism. The main characteristics of the labor model
are as follows:
1) Strategies of agents are costly in the indirect mechanism, i.e., agent with
type H (or L) will spend the strategic costs eH=H (or eH=L) when choosing
education level eH ;
2) The productivity type of agent is his private information and not observable
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to the rm;
3) Misreporting a higher type is also costly, i.e., a low-productivity agent can
pretend to be a high-productivity agent with the misreporting cost cmis > 0.
Section 4 and Section 5 give detailed analysis about the labor model:
1) In the indirect mechanism  , the utility function of each agent i = 1; 2
is given by Eq (3), and the separating strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) is the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium when wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L). Thus, the social
choice function f can be implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2) In the direct mechanism, the utility function of agent is modied from Eq
(3) to Eq (9) and Eq (10). Under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
equilibrium of the game induced by the direct mechanism is to xedly report
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and the truthful report ^

i = i (for all i 2 i, i = 1; 2) is
not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Thus, the Bayesian implementable social choice function f given in Eq (1) is
not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium under the condi-
tion of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), which means that the revelation principle does not
always hold when strategies of agents are costly.
3) Dierent from Kephart and Conitzer [6], this paper shows that the rev-
elation principle can fail to hold even when misreporting cost cmis = 0 (see
Proposition 4).
Appendix
Proposition 23.D.1 [3]: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash E-
quilibrium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that
implements the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements f() in Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um, then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
g(s()) = f() for all , and for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.2)
for all s^i 2 Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(si (^i); s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.3)
for all ^i 2 i. Since g(s()) = f() for all , (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23.D.4)
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for all ^i 2 i. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1), the condition for f()
to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
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